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Abstract
The concept of forming harmonious coalitions is introduced to both classical and
quantum symmetric cooperative game. In both cases, players are motivated to form
coalitions. Also, the main feature of the cooperative game is conserved.
Keywords: Cooperative Game; Harmonious Coalition; Quantum Game.
1 Introduction
Game theory [1, 2] is the study of mathematical models of conflict and cooperation be-
tween rational individuals. It had been formalised by Neumann and Morgenstern [1].
Game theory is applied to many areas especially social and biological sciences [2].
Cooperative game [2] is an interesting element of game theory. Players can form coali-
tions, binding agreements, etc. Therefore, it is important to investigate forming coalitions
in a cooperative game. The main feature of a cooperative game is the characteristic func-
tion of a coalition. It is the payoff which a coalition assures for itself for all strategies of
the opponent. Classical cooperative game is a zero-sum game, and players are found to
be motivated to form a coalition.
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There is an increasing interest in applying some concepts of quantum mechanics to
many scientific fields. For example, in quantum information theory [3], quantum me-
chanics offers new possibilities for the communication and processing information. Super-
position principle and entanglement are fundamental concepts in quantum information
theory.
A combination of game theory and concepts of quantum information theory leads to
quantum game theory [4, 5]. Quantisation of games allows to expand the strategy space
to a Hilbert space of strategies instead of a set of few pure classical strategies. Also,
linear superpositions between strategies are allowed. The Marinatto-Weber’s scheme [5]
is simple and straight forward. It is applied to quantise many classical games [6, 7, 8].
Iqbal and Toor [6] had studied a quantum symmetric cooperative game. In their
scheme, players are not motivated to form a coalition, and the zero-sum property is lost.
In many situations, individuals are allowed to have binding agreements and forming a
coalition beforehand. This is obvious in sport competitions and political party formation.
Therefore, we modify the Iqbal and Toor’s scheme [6] by assuming coalitions beforehand.
Also, the concept of harmonious coalition is introduced. Harmonious coalition means
players in the same coalition use the same strategy (pure or a superposition of strategies).
Marinatto-Weber’s scheme [5] is used. Players are found to be motivated to form a
coalition, and the zero-sum property of the game is conserved.
2 Classical Form
A classical three-player and zero-sum cooperative game [6] with pure strategies is given
as:
Γ = 〈N = {1, 2, 3}, UN = {F,E}, PN : U1 × U2 × U3 −→ R〉, (1)
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where N is the number of players, U is the strategy and P is the payoff. LetQ = {A,B,C}
be the set of players. Each player chooses one strategy F or E. If the three players choose
the same strategy, then every player gets zero of money. The two players who choose the
same strategy get one unit of money each from the single player. Then, the payoff matrix
is given as follows:
Table 1: Payoff matrix for the cooperative game, when player C plays strategy F.
player B: F player B: E
player A: F (0,0,0) (1,-2,1)
player A: E (-2,1,1) (1,1,-2)
Table 2: Payoff matrix for the cooperative game, when player C plays strategy E.
player B: F player B: E
player A: F (1,1,-2) (-2,1,1)
player A: E (1,-2,1) (0,0,0)
where the left payoff is for player A, the middle is for player B, and the right is for
player C.
Let ξ be a subset of Q. The players in ξ form a harmonious coalition. The coalition
appears as a single player with the same strategy. Suppose ξ = {B,C}, then Q−ξ = {A},
and Γξ is the coalition game given by the following payoff matrix:
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Table 3: Payoff matrix for the cooperative game, when players B and C form a coalition.
Coalition ξ: FF Coalition ξ: EE
player A: F (0,0) (-2,2)
player A: E (-2,2) (0,0)
where the left payoff is for player A, and the right payoff is for the coalition ξ.
It is often useful and more realistic to expand the strategy space to include mixed
strategies. Consider player A may play strategy F with probability p and strategy E with
probability 1−p, and the coalition ξ may play strategy F with probability q and strategy
E with probability 1− q. Then the expected payoff of Q− ξ is:
PQ−ξ = 4pq − 2p− 2q. (2)
At an equilibrium, the expected payoff can not depend on the probability q, then its
partial derivative with respect to q must be set to zero. This gives p = 1
2
, and the optimal
mixed strategy for Q− ξ becomes 1
2
[F ] + 1
2
[E]. Similarly, for the coalition ξ the optimal
mixed strategy is 1
2
[FF ] + 1
2
[EE].
The coalition ξ is guaranteed to gain a payoff 1 for all strategies of the single player.
Then, the characteristic function of the coalition ξ is υ(Γξ) = 1. Also, the characteristic
function of the single player Q− ξ is υ(ΓQ−ξ) = −1. Therefore, for any single player,
υ({A}) = υ({B}) = υ({C}) = −1. (3)
And for any coalition,
υ({A,B}) = υ({B,C}) = υ({C,A}) = 1. (4)
Because the characteristic function of a coalition is the highest, players are motivated to
form a coalition.
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3 Quantum Form
We use Marinatto-Weber’s scheme [5] to quantise the symmetric cooperative game with
harmonious coalition. A harmonious coalition with players B and C ia assumed. This
means players B and C have to choose the same strategy. Therefore, we suppose an
entangled initial quantum state as follow:
|ψin〉 = CFFF |FFF 〉+ CEFF |EFF 〉+ CFEE|FEE〉+ CEEE|EEE〉, (5)
where the coefficients CFFF , CEFF , CFEE, CEEE ∈ C, such that
|CFFF |
2 + |CEFF |
2 + |CFEE|
2 + |CEEE|
2 = 1. (6)
The ket |FFF 〉 means player A plays strategy |F 〉, player B plays strategy |F 〉, and
player C plays strategy |F 〉, i.e. |FFF 〉 = |F 〉⊗|F 〉⊗|F 〉. Because of the harmony of the
coalition the terms containing |EEF 〉, |EFE〉, |FFE〉 , and |FEF 〉 are excluded from
the initial state.
The unitary operators are defined as follows: the identity operator I =
(
1 0
0 1
)
, and
pauli-spin flip operator σ =
(
0 1
1 0
)
, where
σ|F 〉 = |E〉, σ|E〉 = |F 〉, σ = σ† = σ−1,
I|F 〉 = |F 〉, I|E〉 = |E〉, I = I† = I−1.
(7)
After the initial state was introduced to players, the single player {A} and the coalition
{B,C} carry out their strategies with probabilities p and q with the identity operator,
and 1− p and 1− q with the pauli-spin flip operator, respectively on the initial state.
The initial density matrix of ψin is
ρin = |ψin〉〈ψin|.
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ρin =[CFFF |FFF 〉+ CEFF |EFF 〉+ CFEE|FEE〉+ CEEE|EEE〉]
.[C∗FFF 〈FFF |+ C
∗
EFF 〈EFF |+ C
∗
FEE〈FEE|+ C
∗
EEE〈EEE|].
(8)
Then,
ρin =


|CFFF |
2 0 0 CFFFC
∗
FEE CFFFC
∗
EFF 0 0 CFFFC
∗
EEE
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
CFEEC
∗
FFF 0 0 |CFEE|
2 CFEEC
∗
EFF 0 0 CFEEC
∗
EEE
CEFFC
∗
FFF 0 0 CEFFC
∗
FEE |CEFF |
2 0 0 CEFFC
∗
EEE
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
CEEEC
∗
FFF 0 0 CEEEC
∗
FEE CEEEC
∗
EFF 0 0 |CEEE|
2


. (9)
The final density matrix after players have played their strategies can be written as
ρfin = pq IA ⊗ IB ⊗ IC ρin I
†
A ⊗ I
†
B ⊗ I
†
C
+ p(1− q) IA ⊗ σB ⊗ σC ρin I
†
A ⊗ σ
†
B ⊗ σ
†
C
+ (1− p)q σA ⊗ IB ⊗ IC ρin σ
†
A ⊗ I
†
B ⊗ I
†
C
+ (1− p)(1− q) σA ⊗ σB ⊗ σC ρin σ
†
A ⊗ σ
†
B ⊗ σ
†
C .
(10)
The payoff operators for players A, B and C are
PA,B,C = a1, b1, c1|FFF 〉〈FFF |+ a2, b2, c2|EFF 〉〈EFF |
+ a3, b3, c3|FEE〉〈FEE|+ a4, b4, c4|EEE〉〈EEE|.
(11)
where the constants ai, bi and ci, i = 1, 2, 3, 4 are the classical payoffs. The expected
payoff functions of players A, B and C are
$A,B,C = Tr[PA,B,C ρfin]. (12)
From the classical payoff of players A, B and C in Tables 1 and 2 the constants in Eq.
(11) become
a1 = a4 = 0, a2 = a3 = −2,
b1 = b4 = 0, b2 = b3 = 1,
c1 = c4 = 0, c2 = c3 = 1.
(13)
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Then
$A(p, q) = [|CFFF |
2 + |CEEE|
2][4pq − 2p− 2q]
+ [|CFEE|
2 + |CEFF |
2][−4pq + 2p+ 2q − 2].
(14)
$B,C(p, q) = [|CFFF |
2 + |CEEE|
2][−2pq + p+ q]
+ [|CFEE|
2 + |CEFF |
2][2pq − p− q + 1].
(15)
From Eqs. (14) and (15), it is obvious that $A(p, q)+$B(p, q)+$C(p, q) = 0. This ensures
the zero-sum property of the quantum game in our scheme.
To investigate how the quantum aspect affects the outcome of the game, the expected
payoffs $A and $B,C are plotted with respect to both the probabilities p and q at different
values for the constants |CFFF |
2, |CEFF |
2, |CFEE|
2, and |CEEE|
2 that corresponding to
different initial states. In Fig. 1, |CFFF |
2 = 1, the initial state is non entangled. The
classical game payoffs appear as limiting points of the payoffs of the quantum version for
non entangled initial states. Fig. 2 shows the relation between both $A and $B,C and
the probabilities p and q for an entangled initial state. The payoffs for the maximally
entangled initial state are shown in Fig. 3. Because of the zero-sum property, the behavior
of $B + $C is the inverse of the behavior of $A in all cases. Figs. 1-3 clearly show the
dependence of the expected payoff in the quantum version on the initial quantum state
and the players strategies.
Now, let the coalition ξ play the mixed strategy s[FF ] + (1− s)[EE], and the single
player Q − ξ play the mixed strategy t[F ] + (1 − t)[E]. In this case the payoff of the
coalition ξ is obtained as
Pξ =stPξ[FFF ] + s(1− t)Pξ[EFF ]
+ (1− s)tPξ[FEE] + (1− s)(1− t)Pξ[EEE],
(16)
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where Pξ[FFF ] is the payoff of ξ when all players play the strategy [F ], i.e. p = 1 and
q = 1. Now from Eq. (15), we get
Pξ[FFF ] = PB[11] + PC [11] = 2[|CFEE|
2 + |CEFF |
2] = Pξ[EEE], (17)
Pξ[EFF ] = PB[01] + PC [01] = 2[|CFFF |
2 + |CEEE|
2] = Pξ[FEE]. (18)
Therefore, from Eq. (16), we get
Pξ =2st[|CFEE|
2 + |CEFF |
2] + 2s(1− t)[|CFFF |
2 + |CEEE|
2]
+ 2(1− s)t[|CFFF |
2 + |CEEE|
2] + 2(1− s)(1− t)[|CFEE|
2 + |CEFF |
2].
(19)
To get the optimal payoff, the partial derivative with respect to t must be set to zero.
It gives s = 1
2
. Similarly, for the single player t = 1
2
. Therefore, the characteristic function
of the coalition ξ becomes
υ(Γξ) = υ({B,C})
= |CFFF |
2 + |CEFF |
2 + |CFEE|
2 + |CEEE|
2 = 1.
(20)
Similarly, the payoff of the single player Q− ξ is
PQ−ξ =stPQ−ξ[FFF ] + s(1− t)PQ−ξ[EFF ]
+ (1− s)tPQ−ξ[FEE] + (1− s)(1− t)PQ−ξ[EEE].
(21)
From Eq. (14), we get
PQ−ξ[FFF ] = PA[11] = −2[|CFEE|
2 + |CEFF |
2] = PQ−ξ[EEE], (22)
PQ−ξ[EFF ] = PA[01] = −2[|CFFF |
2 + |CEEE|
2] = PQ−ξ[FEE]. (23)
Then
υ(ΓQ−ξ) = υ({A}) = −[|CFFF |
2 + |CEFF |
2 + |CFEE|
2 + |CEEE|
2] = −1 (24)
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From Eqs. (20) and (24), the quantised game is a zero-sum game, and the players
have the advantage to form a coalition.
A harmonious coalition with players A and B can be assumed using the following
initial state:
|ψin〉 = CFFF |FFF 〉+ CFFE|FFE〉+ CEEF |EEF 〉+ CEEE|EEE〉. (25)
Using the same procedures, we get:
υ({A,B}) = 1 and υ({C}) = −1. (26)
Similarly, for a coalition with players A and C, we have
υ({A,C}) = 1 and υ({B}) = −1. (27)
These findings conserve the results of the classical form. But these results are in disagree-
ment with the results of Iqbal and Toor [6], that both the motivation for forming coalition
and the zero-sum property are lost in the quantised version.
The differences between Iqbal and Toor’s scheme [6] and ours are summarized in
the following. We assume an initial state that allows to form a coalition beforehand.
Introducing the concept of harmonious coalition that makes the coalition behaves as a
single player.
4 Conclusion
Both classical and quantum versions of the cooperative game may have similar features;
but they differ in details. The classical version depends only on a set of few pure classical
strategies. In quantum version, the strategy space is extended to a Hilbert space of
strategies. The initial quantum state prepared by an arbiter plays a crucial role in the
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quantum form. For some initial states, cooperation and forming a coalition are very
important (our work). For some other initial states, cooperation is useless [6].
The payoff in the quantum version depends on both the initial state and the players
strategies (see Figs. 1-3). The classical version of the game appears as a limiting point
of the quantum version (see Fig. 1). The initial quantum state acts like a social contract
that organizes the relations between quantum players.
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(a) The expected payoff for player A.
(b) The expected payoff for players B
and C.
Figure 1: The expected payoffs of players when |CFFF |
2 = 1.
(a) The expected payoff for player A.
(b) The expected payoff for players B
and C.
Figure 2: The expected payoffs of players when |CFFF |
2 = 0.1, |CEFF |
2 = 0.4, |CFEE|
2 =
0.3 and |CEEE|
2 = 0.2.
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(a) The expected payoff for player A.
(b) The expected payoff for players B
and C.
Figure 3: The expected payoffs of players when |CFFF |
2 = |CEFF |
2 = |CFEE|
2 =
|CEEE|
2 = 1/4.
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